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Recovery of Lost
Future Wages for the
Breach of an At Will
Employment Contract
by James Kevin MacAlister

I. Introduction
t common law, "an employment
contract of indefinite duration,
that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at
any time." 1 In spite of their proclaimed intent to enforce the time-worn axiom, Maryland's appellate courts have recognized
that, under the appropriate circumstances,
a former at will employee can state a cause
of action in contract against the employer
who terminated him.2 With the recognition of these claims will soon come the unenviable task of determining what the former employee's damages should be.
This article addresses a small fraction of
the issues raised in the opening paragraph:
the employer's exposure to damages for lost
future wages. Constructing the proper formula for calculating this exposure begins
with a recognition that at will employment
is a unique contractual relationship that
merits special treatment. Next, a number
of the principles that govern awards of
damages in contract actions, and damage
awards in general, are examined in an effort to determine the proper elements of
the formula. Lastly, the formula is applied
to the breach of an at will employment
co.ntract to demonstrate that lost future
wages should not be recoverable.

A

parts: the contract for a fixed duration, and
more importantly, the life employment
contract.
The contract for a fixed duration is precisely what its name implies. Along with
its guarantee offixed tenure, it carries with
it an implied covenant that the employee
will only be discharged for cause. 5 Because
of these guarantees, the courts have held
that an employee who is unlawfully dismissed before the end of his term can recover for the lost future wages that would
have been paid until the end of that period. 6

A life employment contract is also self
defining. It is the complete surrender by
the employer of the right to discharge an
employee, except for cause, for the remainder of the employee's life. 7 Because
this imports serious consequences, the
Maryland judiciary has placed two significant hurdles in the paths of would be life
employees. First, it must appear that the
employee's duties and salary are set forth
in the agreementS in terms that are "fixed
and definite, with little or no room for misunderstanding." 9 Thus, unlike the at will

II. Employment at Will
In spite of the recent chinks in its armor,
the employment at will doctrine is alive
and well in Mary1and. 3 Under this rule of
the workplace, an employee hired for an
indefinite duration can be fired at any time,
for any reason. Thus, it carries with it no
promises of job security or tenure, or that
dismissal will only be for cause. 4 This, the
most common employment relationship,
should be contrasted from its two counterSpring, 1986/The Law Forum-ll

employee whose tenure and wages are always subject to change, the life employer
and employee must fix all the terms of
their bargain at the outset; nothing can be
left for future negotiation.
Second, special consideration must have
been surrendered by the employee in exchange for the promise oflife tenure. 10This
consideration must be in addition to the
"services incident to the employment." 11
Thus, merely remaining on the job after
being guaranteed life tenure is insufficient
consideration for a guarantee of permanent
employment. 12 Moreover, resigning a job
or incurring a detriment in preparation for
accepting a position do not qualify as adequate consideration. 13 Rather, there must
be an independent detriment or benefit,
such as surrendering a personal injury
claim, to qualify as adequate consideration.14
When the parties have gone through the
rigors of forming a life employment contract, and the employer unlawfully fires
the employee, future wages are a proper
element of damages. 15 These damages can
be measured by resorting to an actuarial
table or by compensating the employee as
though he had worked until retirement. 16

III. Contract Damages
The mere breach of a contract by one
party does not automatically entitle the
nonbreaching party to compensation for
all his losses. Instead, a number of rules
have been formulated over time to limit
the breaching party's exposure to liability.
These theories are not only supported by
stare decisis l7 but by economics as well.
The economic argument for limiting the
exposure for a breach of contract is known
as the efficient breach hypothesis. 18 This
theory presupposes that it is economically
advantageous for consumers if the manufacturers and suppliers of goods and services can escape unprofitable bargains. 19
In other words, society as a whole benefits
when an unprofitable deal is forsaken for a
profitable one.

A. Expectation Damages
The hallmark of the efficient breach
hypothesis is the notion that the injured
party is entitled to claim the benefit of his
bargain,21 or the difference between what
was promised and what he actually received.
Thus, other than the amorality of repudiating a bargain, an efficient breach benefits
all concerned. The breaching party and society as a whole obtain the benefit of the efficient breach, and the non-breaching party
receives his profit. 22
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Although it has yet to articulate an efficient breach argument in support of its
decisions, the Maryland judiciary has consistently held that a contract plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of his bargain, his anticipated gain. 23 The benefit of the bargain
rule serves not only as a tool for determining the plaintiff's damage, but it also serves
to limit his recovery to his anticipated gain.

B. Consequential Damages
Although damages are confined to the
expectation interest, the non-defaulting
party can also recover consequential damages. 24 But, just as it does with benefit of
the bargain damages, the law of contracts
presupposes that the parties have developed a mutual expectancy of the consequences of their breach. Hence, only those
consequential damages that were reasonably foreseeable to all parties at the time
of contracting can be recovered. 25 Consequences or contingencies known only to
one party are not proper elements of damage. Of course, if one party notifies the
other party at the time of contracting that
there are unique consequences, the otherwise unforeseeable consequences can become a proper element of damages. 26

D. Punitive Damagesl
Emotional Suffering
Lastly, in a further effort to confine
damage to the terms of the contract, the
courts have determined that punitive damages 33 and damages for emotional distress
are not recoverable in contract actions. 34
The absolute ban on punitive damages in
contract actions is perhaps the supreme
triumph of the efficient breach hypothesis.
Fearing that exposure to punitive damages
will deter parties from breaching inefficient
agreements,35 the Maryland judiciary has
determined that the punitive and deterrent
policies that justify awarding punitive
damages in general, must be forsaken in
contract actions. 36

IV. The Law of Damages
in General
Over the years, a number of limitations
have been developed to guide all efforts to
recover damages. Primarily, these limitations hold the injured party to the burden
of establishing the nature and extent of his
loss. In other words, these are not policybased theories, but standards of proof that
all plaintiffs must clear before a finding of
fact will be allowed awarding them damages.

A. Reasonable Certainty
C. Mitigation
As a further limitation on damages, the
law of contracts does not allow the injured
party to sit idly by while his damages multiply. Rather, it imposes upon him two absolute duties. The first, known as the doctrine of avoidable harms, requires that the
injured party make reasonable efforts to
avoid aggravating his damages. 27 The second requires that he make reasonable efforts to mitigate or reduce his damages. 28
Because avoidable damages and mitigation
are viewed as a defensive issue, the burden
of raising and proving the facts is on the
defendant. 29
In the area of employment contracting,
the duty to mitigate is quite strict. It requires that the former employee accept comparable employment at a comparable rate
of pay "in the same or similar business." 30
Although a failure to mitigate is not fatal to
a former employee's claim, any recovery
he would have recovered will be reduced
by the amount of money that he would have
earned, had he taken reasonable efforts to
find suitable employment. 31 As the defendant, the employer has the burden of pro ving these mitigating factors. 32

Before any element of damages can be
placed before the finder offact, it must appear that its amount has been established
with reasonable certainty,31 Under this
standard of proof, mathematical precision
is not required. 38 Rather, the plaintiff need
only prove a reasonable basis for determining the extent of his loss. In short, he must
show something more than losses based on
mere speculation or conjecture. 39 Moreover, even when the damages are uncertain
the courts have recognized that a defendant
whose breach has "caused a difficulty of
proving damage . . . cannot complain of
the resulting uncertainty." 40
In cases where the rule of certainty is
fatal to the plaintiff's expectation interest,
the courts have recognized that he is entitled to recover reliance damages. 41 These
are the total sums expended by the plaintiffin preparation to and in performance of
the contract, less, of course, any renumeration received from the breaching party.42

B. Lost Profits
Combining many of the rules ofcontract
law and the test of reasonable certainty,
the courts have developed a formalized ap-

proach to claims for lost profits. These
claims must assert that the defendant's
breach caused the loss of profit, and that
the defendant should have reasonably
foreseen at the time of contracting that the
loss of profits would probably result from
a breach. 43 Of course, the lost profits must
be proven to a reasonable certainty. 44
In meeting this test ofcertainty, plaintiffs
have been allowed to project their lost future profits from past performance of a
business. 45 These projections are only
permitted when there is a sufficient history of profit from which a projection can
be drawn. 46

C. Future Harm
There is no presumption of the permanancy of an injury. 47 Thus, the party claiming future harm must offer some basis for
concluding that a condition caused by the
defendant's wrongdoing is unlikely to
change. 48 This requires proof that there be
greater than fifty percent chance that future injury will occur. 49 In some instances,
this can be accomplished by proof testimony of the injury itself. 50 These cases,
however, are limited to instances where the
injury itself is outwardly, visibly permanent. 5! Any other injury requires expert
testimony supporting its permanency. 52
Although the opinion of the expert can be
cast in general terms, it must appear that
there is an appropriate foundation to support his conclusion that the injury is a permanent one. 53 A permanent injury must
be contrasted from the suffering in the future. Apparently, a lesser standard ofproof
is required when intangible future suffering is in issue, but the cases applying this
reduced standard of certainty have thus far
involved only tort claims for intangible
losses. 54

Analysis
To qualify as an element of damages in a
suit for breach of an at will employment
contract, a claim for lost future wages must
survive the gauntlet of rules set forth in the
previous section. Not only must it satisfy
the economic and legal qualifications imposed by the law of contracts, but it must
also meet the standards of proof required
to generate an issue offact. Accordingly, it
must be sifted through each element of the
formula.

A. The Law of Contracts
Under Maryland's at will employment
doctrine, the only certainty that the parties
have created is uncertainty. As a matter of

law, they have created a relationship in
which neither party can count on the other's
future performance. In the words of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, their relationship "can be terminated at the pleasure
of either party at any time." 55 Thus, the
benefit of the bargain is only that the employer will pay the employee for time actually worked. 56
At least one jurisdiction, however, has
awarded lost future wages, reasoning that,
but for the defendant's breach, the employee would have remained on the job
until retirement,51 To allow damages for
lost future wages for the breach of an at will
employment contract is to engage in nothing less than a wholesale judicial rewriting
of the contract forged by the parties. Had
they wished to secure the employee's tenure, they could have contracted for a fixed
period or entered into a life employment
contract. But they chose, instead, to select
employment for an indefinite term, a relationship that, as a matter oflaw, promises
no security. In other words, if lost future
wages become an element of damages, the
at will employment contract will be transformed into a life employment contract, in
direct contravention of the parties' expectation and intent. 58
Not only does a recovery of lost future
wages in an employment at will case permit a party a benefit that he never bargained
for, but it severely inhibits the employer's
ability to breach the contract with economic
efficiency. Faced with the prospect ofhaving to pay an employee the wages he would
otherwise earn over his lifetime with the
company, only the foolhardiest employer
would terminate any employee other than
according to the terms of the contract. And
since dismissal for cause is the only ground
for lawfully terminating the contract, a
more efficient or better qualified employee
could not be substituted for an employee
who has not committed a grave enough act
of misconduct to warrant his dismissal for
cause. 59 Accordingly, not only is the employer saddled with the cost of the less efficient employee, but consumers who purchase the goods and services produced by
the employee are equally burdened.

B. The Law of Damages
Even iflost future wages can be deemed
an element of damages for the loss ofat will
employment, it is difficult to conceive of
how this loss should be measured. Under a
simplistic approach applied by several federal courts in so called "front pay" decisions,
it is possible to look to the employee's wages
before the breach and after the breach. 60
Also, the sales made by retained brokers

and salesmen have been used to extrapolate
how a former broker or salesman would
have performed, but for the employer's
breach of duty. 6! This same theory could
conceivably be used to predict how a terminated employee would have performed,
had he remained with his employer. Lastly,
actuarial tables or a mandatory retirement
age could be consulted to fix the duration
of the 10ss.62

Under Maryland's
at will employment
doctrine, the only
certainty that the
parties have created
is uncertainty.

1. Amount of Damages: The fallacy of these theories is that they are based
on a series of fictions, compiled of compounded "what if's." First, there is the assumption that the employee would have
served the remainder of his career with the
company. Not only is this assumption rebutted by the mobility of the modern workforce, but it flies in the face of the at will
employment doctrine's no-tenure policy.
Second, all three theories assume that,
had the employee remained with the company, he would have been the recipient of
salary increases and promotions accorded
his co-workers. In cases where salary increases were given automatically, perhaps
the employer's post termination conduct
can serve as a guide for measuring what the
lost future wages should be. Also, while it
is plausible that a former employee's unblemished record arguably supports the
inference that he would have received
merit increases given to other employees,
it is sheer speculation to assume that promotions actually would have been forthcoming, especially when the employer
thought so little of the employee's services
that he fired him. Merit raises and promotions are generally the product of the individual's qualities. Thus, comparisons between employees is based on the flawed
notion that all employees perform equally.
Even if these postulations could serve as
a basis for fixing a dollar amount, the effect
of the mitigation requirement has yet to be
Spring, 19861The Law Forum-13

considered. As previously indicated, the law
of contracts will not allow the terminated
employee to sit idly by for the remainder
of his career. The effect of the mitigation
requirement is that it guarantees that the
lost future wages claim will be something
less than the amount of wages that would
have been paid for the remainder of the
employee's life. The "front pay" decisions
seize upon mitigation as an important check
on unreasonably high verdicts. 63 These
decisions, however, decline to explain precisely how the employee's performance at
his new job can be predicted with any degree of certainty. Surely, Maryland's law
oflost profits would bar the projection of
future profit where there is no past performance at the new job from which to project
the future loss. At worst, the employer's
inability to prove mitigation would preclude his use of that defense. At best, the
speculations built into approximating lost
future wages would be compounded by
the employer's baseless speculations.
Also, the proof oflost future wages and
mitigation are based on the false premise
that the disparity proven at trial will never
change. Perhaps, with the new employment opportunity will come better opportunities, perhaps not. But there is no rational basis for guessing what the future
will hold.

2. Duration of Injury: The speculative assumptions outlined above ignore
the element of duration. To recover prospective relief, the former employee must
show that his injury will continue into the
future. Some courts respond to this problem by arguing that the law of personal injury can be used to fix the duration oflost
future wages. 64 While Maryland allows
lost future wages in personal injury cases,
it must appear. that the injury has some
permanency. 65 Perhaps the most glaringly
erroneous assumption of all is that the employee's situation will remain unchanged
over the remainder of his career. In other
words, the loss of one job is transformed
into a permanent disability, without proof
that the loss of employment will have definite future consequences. Unlike the unrepairable loss of a hand or foot, the law of
employment contracting imposes upon the
employee the affirmative duty of healing
his wounds and moving on to another employer. Therefore, the assumption that the
employee will remain disabled for the remainder of his professional career is as unsupported by the law and by the realities of
the job market.
14-The Law Forum/Spring, 1986

V. Conclusion
Although some states have opted to allow awards for lost future wages for the
breach of an at will employment contract,
Maryland should side with those jurisdictions that have rejected these claims. The
bases for rejecting such claims are not limited to their speculative nature.
Confining the support behind the rejection to lack of proof would surely produce
two criticisms. First, that the wrongdoer is
allowed to escape liability because he was
fortunate enough to inflict an incalculable
injury. Second, that lost future wages
should at least be awarded until the close
of trial. This second solution would certainly cure the uncertainty and duration
problems.
To avoid these issues, it is wisest to confront the lost future wages issue for its inconsistency with established principles of
contract law. By definition, at will employment creates only the expectation of
what its name implies: no guarantee offuture employment is reserved or promised.
Thus, the employee's expectation interest,
which the law of contract strives to compensate, extends only to being compensated for time served.
Thus, while claims for lost future wages
attributable to the breach of an at will employment contract are nothing less than the
guesses of the parties' witnesses and experts, the speculative damages issue need
not be reached. As a matter ofcontract law,
lost future wages are not a proper element
of damage.
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